This question is much more than a purely economic or fiscal consideration. It touches on the core of the state's protective mandate under Section 1 of the GlüStV. Player protection, addiction prevention, and the integrity of sporting competition can only be effectively addressed where state supervision exists. The illegal market operates beyond this control: without connection to the OASIS blocking system, without monitoring by (GGL) for the internet or from the competent state authorities for terrestrial services.
It is important to make a technical distinction here: these are often not “dark” websites in the traditional sense, but professional-looking platforms that have licenses from third countries or other EU member states (e.g., Malta, Curaçao, or Gibraltar).
However, as these providers do not comply with specific German security and social concepts or tax requirements, they are considered illegal under German law. This distinction is often difficult for end users to recognize, which makes it difficult to achieve the channeling objectives.
The black market as a complementary metric
The State Treaty on Gaming pursues the goal of channeling (§ 1 No. 2 GlüStV). This means that the success of regulation is not measured by the absence of gambling, but by its transfer into controlled channels. In the 2026 evaluation, the black market will therefore not be considered an isolated marginal phenomenon, but rather the decisive benchmark for the legal market.
Scientific experts will examine whether the strict German regulations – such as the 5-second rule for virtual slot machines or the €1,000 deposit limit – have a protective effect or whether they act as an “accelerator of migration.” If the data shows that the use of the illegal market has increased in correlation with the introduction of restrictive measures in the legal sector, this would have to be considered a structural mismanagement.
Methodology for recording the black market: From estimates to evidence
The biggest methodological hurdle in the evaluation is that the illegal market does not submit any official annual reports. In order to obtain a reliable database nonetheless, various complex survey methods will be combined in 2026:
Web monitoring and traffic analysis: Specialized analysis tools will be used to measure how many visits are made from German IP addresses to unlicensed gambling domains. This data will provide a picture of the reach and intensity of use of the black market.
Payment flow analyses: In cooperation with banks and payment service providers, the transaction volume in the area of so-called “high-risk payments” is examined. Since gambling transactions often use specific codes (MCC 7995), migration movements can be quantified financially.
Representative player surveys (prevalence studies): Anonymous surveys provide information on how many players consciously or unconsciously use illegal offers and what motives (e.g., higher chances of winning, no limits) are decisive for this.
Data from law enforcement agencies: The number of preliminary investigations initiated for illegal gambling (Section 284 of the German Criminal Code) and the results of priority public prosecutors' offices are included as indicators of the dynamics on the provider side.
Enforcement as a regulatory corrective
A significant part of the evaluation is devoted to assessing the enforcement instruments of the GGL. The focus here is on two measures in particular:
Payment blocking: Prohibiting payment flows to illegal providers by involving credit institutions and e-wallet providers. The evaluation must examine how resilient the system is against cryptocurrencies and alternative payment models.
IP blocking: The technical blocking of websites by internet service providers. This instrument is legally controversial and can be circumvented technically (e.g., through VPN). The evaluation will assess whether IP blocking makes a significant contribution to channeling or whether the effort is disproportionate to the benefit.
Risk analysis: Lack of player protection in the shadow market
A key argument for adjusting the regulation could be the realization that the black market actively undermines player protection. Illegal providers often specifically advertise that they do not use OASIS queries or LUGAS limits. The evaluation will examine the extent to which blocked players (from OASIS) systematically migrate to the black market.
Reports from addiction support facilities and counseling centers are used as qualitative data for this purpose. If the evaluation proves that the “blocking effect” of German regulation merely leads to a shift of risk to a completely unprotected space, this would have far-reaching consequences for the future design of the State Treaty.
Economic implications and tax fairness
In addition to the social aspects, the illegal market has a significant fiscal dimension. While licensed providers pay taxes on bets, illegal operators completely evade this obligation. This leads to a competitive disadvantage for the legal market, as illegal providers can offer more attractive payout ratios (RTP - Return to Player) and higher bonuses due to the lack of tax burden and lower compliance costs. The evaluation will calculate the tax losses caused by the black market and whether the current tax structure supports or hinders the channeling objectives.
International perspective and European case law
Since online gambling operates across borders, the illegal market cannot be viewed purely from a national perspective. The 2026 evaluation will also examine how successful cooperation with foreign regulatory authorities (e.g., the Malta Gaming Authority) has been. In addition, the compatibility of German measures with the freedom to provide services in the EU internal market plays a role. The case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the coherence of gambling policy forms the legal framework within which Germany's fight against the black market must operate.
Conclusion and regulatory significance
The illegal gambling market is the “mirror image” in which the weaknesses of legal regulation become visible. In the 2026 evaluation, the volume of the black market will be the most important judge of the work of the Joint Gambling Authority of the German states and the adequacy of the legal requirements. A growing black market would signal that the balance between protection and attractiveness has been lost. A shrinking market, on the other hand, would be proof of the effectiveness of the “German approach.” Ultimately, the analysis of the illegal market will determine whether Germany needs to liberalize its regulatory system in order to remain competitive, or whether the repressive instruments for market foreclosure are sufficient or even need to be tightened further.
Read the third part of our series on the evaluation of the State Treaty on Gaming here.
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